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European Trade Policy 
Although it is one of the oldest and most important supranational competencies, trade policy 
has so far failed to attract much attention from interpretivist scholars. This is a pity, given that 
the complexities and the increasingly normative tone of EU trade politics lend themselves 
well to a post-positivist gaze.
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 To support this claim, this chapter begins with an overview of the policy’s main features 
and a brief discussion of why it might appeal to interpretivists. I then present the academic 
‘state of the art’, reviewing both the ‘mainstream’ literature and some of the less conventional 
work that has appeared in its margins. I will show that the latter studies, though very 
interesting, are currently still somewhat ‘patchy’ – lacking programmatic drive. In the final 
section I therefore outline three avenues for further research. These examples illustrate one, 
ethnographic, way in which the literature may choose to move forward.  
 
1. The Conduct and Substance of EU Trade Policy 
Trade policy has been an exclusive EU competence since the Treaties of Rome, although the 
boundaries of this authority have expanded through decades of institutional wrangling. Since 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU’s exclusivity includes all topics that are currently considered a 
trade issue at the world stage – including investment, services and commercial aspects of 
intellectual property. The Common Commercial Policy includes a series of different policies, 
each characterized by distinct politics and policy-making procedures, usefully grouped into 
the multi-, bi- and unilateral ‘sub-systems’ by Young and Peterson (2014).  
The multilateral level concerns talks within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the boundaries, enforced through the dispute-settlement mechanism, set out by its rules and 
procedures. Especially since the late eighties, the EU has become increasingly assertive in the 
multilateral rounds – playing an important role in the progressive liberalization of free trade 
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across an ever expanding set of sectors (a notorious exception being agriculture). The EU was 
also one of the driving forces behind the push towards new/deep trade issues (Poletti 2012). In 
recent years, however, its commitment to the WTO has diminished. The policy of 
‘multilateralism first’ that was put in place by Commissioner Lamy (1999-2005) was 
abandoned with the arrival of Peter Mandelson and the 2006 ‘Global Europe’ 
Communication, which set out a more aggressive bi-/pluri-lateral strategy.  
The bilateral system involves the panoply of free trade agreements (FTAs) that the EU 
can conclude with other states. The authority to propose and negotiate treaties has been 
delegated to the European Commission (EC), while adoption requires a qualified majority of 
member states in the Council as well as (since the Lisbon Treaty) a simple majority in the 
European Parliament.
2
 The goals and the relative importance of the bilateral sphere have 
undergone a marked shift. For several decades bilateral agreements were used primarily to 
bolster ties with former colonies and the EU’s neighborhood. This gradually changed over the 
course of the 1990s, with a more drastic turn being taken with the aforementioned Global 
Europe strategy – which reframed the purpose of FTAs in primarily economic terms (Young 
& Peterson, 2014). Since then negotiations have commenced (and have in some cases been 
concluded) with, among others, South-Korea, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Canada, the United 
States, Japan and Vietnam. In accordance with multilateral developments, the types of issues 
covered by these deals have increasingly crept ‘behind the border’: negotiations are not just 
about traditional barriers like tariffs, but also about regulatory issues, product standards and 
other kinds of government intervention (see below). Although there were some shifts in 
emphasis, Global Europe’s core features were largely restated by the 2010 ‘Trade, Growth 
and World Affairs’ communication.   
The third, unilateral sphere includes all the instruments the EU can use to either pry 
open foreign markets or protect its own – outside the negotiating context of the other sub-
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systems.
3
 Here, the trade-defensive tools available to the EU are distinct in both their 
orientation (protection rather than liberalization) as well as their decision making procedures. 
They include safeguards, anti-subsidy measures and anti-dumping duties – the latter being 
used most frequently. Through various reforms of the procedures, the Commission has 
gradually increased its grip over the application of such measures. For example, it can 
currently decide autonomously whether to implement preliminary anti-dumping duties, while 
a proposal to implement final measures can only be rejected by a qualified Council majority. 
The EP plays no formal role here. The trade defensive sub-system has remained an exception 
to the overall trend of EU trade policy, which since the eighties has been oriented towards 
obtaining foreign market access while generally pushing for more liberalization (Young & 
Peterson 2014). For decades now the EU has been one of the biggest users of contingent 
protection, and the amount of industries, products and import value covered by anti-dumping 
has been growing since 2004 (Vandenbussche and Viegelahn 2011).  
All of these sub-systems have had to operate in an international economic and 
regulatory context which has been subject to frequent and drastic changes. One of the more 
important shifts in global commerce of the past twenty years has concerned the substance of 
(what counts as) trade policy itself. Until the 1980s debates were still largely over ’at the 
border’ trade policies like tariffs and quotas. Since then, the global trade agenda has thrown 
an ever wider net. Discussions now deal with previously shielded sectors like services, but 
also tackle ‘behind the border’ items like intellectual property rights, product standards, 
procurement policies, and health, labor and environmental issues. This bulging agenda has 
been considered a threat by a wide variety of actors (labor and farmers’ movements, NGOs), 
who believe that it impedes the state’s ability to intervene, endangering social welfare and 
more equitable forms of globalization. Resistance has gradually increased, piquing first during 
the 1999 WTO negotiations in Seattle, and more recently against big ‘deep-trade’ deals like 
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the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
4
 Together, these shifts have 
fostered trade debates that bear only partial resemblance to the ‘protectionism versus free 
trade’ quarrels that used to animate both public discussions as well as the literature. 
Normative debates over regulatory sovereignty, interventionism, food safety and the host of 
issues related to that pliable notion of ‘fair trade’ have become more prevalent. 
In sum, many of the reasons for why an interpretivist lens makes sense for researching 
the EU in general (see Diez 2016) are relevant a fortiori for trade. Policies are forged by a 
complex decision-making network and are characterized by frequent and long-lasting 
interactions between officials. Policymakers not only have to think about their own (state’s) 
position in this process, but also about how ‘the EU’ as an entity will present itself to and 
interact with a variety of foreign ‘others’. They are confronted with large and increasing 
uncertainty related not only to the effects of their actions but also their goals and means. If 
their debates once possessed a certain amount of numerical simplicity due to the 
overwhelming dominance of material arguments, then this clarity has now made way for the 
headaches of normative disagreement and regulatory politics. As in other fields this has been 
compounded by an influx of heterogeneity through enlargement but also because of 
asymmetric socioeconomic and political shifts across the member states. Meanwhile, elite 
and/or technocratic bargaining has been challenged by the increasing politicization of trade by 
new actors (like NGOs) and new concerns. Finally, there is the mere fact that the EU has 
emerged as an important and assertive co-architect of the global economic system
5
. Even 
without the expansion of the trade agenda or its self-congratulatory narratives, this was bound 
to draw the suspicious eye of ‘critical’ scholars eventually. So far, however, the literature has 
been dominated by more ‘mainstream’ approaches.  
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2. The literature on EU trade policy  
2.1  ‘The mainstream’ 
Most studies on European trade policy build on a more or less rational-institutionalist 
framework (see also the reviews by Orbie and Kerremans 2013 and Siles-Brügge 2014). In 
order to illustrate the main outlines of this literature, I am dividing it (somewhat artificially) 
into three thematic parts.  
The first big set of studies has focused on the struggle between the Commission, the 
Council and (to a far more limited extent) the European Parliament over who holds the reins 
in trade policy (e.g. Meunier, 2005). Much of this work is couched in principal-agent agent 
theorizing, investigating the ways in which tasks are delegated and how the actors involved 
wrestle for autonomy and power by installing (or subverting) various control mechanisms. 
Some recent examples include Gastinger’s (2015) work on the ways in which the Commission 
tried to push its own agenda and evade Council oversight during bilateral negotiations with 
India, or da Conceição-Heldt’s (2011) focus on the effect of intra-Council divisions on 
Commission autonomy at the WTO. Others have looked at intra-Commission negotiations 
(Larsén 2007), at how institutional lock-in prevented a protectionist ‘Fortress Europe’ from 
emerging in the 1990s (Hanson 2003) and at the effects of the 2004 enlargement – both on the 
ability of the Commission to get what it wants as well as the increasing dominance of large 
members states (Elsig 2010). The influence of decision making rules, actors’ cohesion, 
control over the agenda as well as the flow of information, and the scope for informal deal-
making are central independent variables; Commission autonomy the core explanandum (Dür 
& Elsig, 2011). Although these works sometimes pay attention to constructivist elements like 
state identity (see for example Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999) to discuss marginal aspects of 
their narratives, the core of their analysis is quite firmly rooted in rational-institutionalism. 
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Cost-benefit calculations guide the behavior of rational actors, whose motivations and beliefs 
are themselves either exogenous or deduced from the model’s assumptions.  
A second group has explored the role of business and other ‘societal’ actors in trade 
policy-making. Here, authors have for instance looked at the relative power of NGOs versus 
business in accessing the Commission and influencing the policy process (Dür and De Bièvre 
2007), or the role of exporters in pushing for competitive liberalization (Dür 2007; Garcia 
2010). Other examples include Dur and Mateo’s (2014) investigation of the successful defeat 
of the anti-counterfeiting trade agreement (ACTA) by NGOs, and the large amount of texts 
that study the fight between import defensive industries and a liberal coalition in the various 
textile ‘wars’ with Asian economies (Comino 2007; Eckhardt 2011; Heron 2007). Again, 
most of this work can be characterized as conventional, rationalist political-economy although 
there have of course been exceptions. The ambitions and work of Cornelia Woll (2008), for 
example, defy some of our usual categories. Her work deals with preferences and lobbying, 
but also with the ways in which the perceptions and wishes of firms in the services sector 
evolved by interacting with changing institutions, ideas and interests.  
A third strand is more concerned with the behavior of ‘the EU’ as an actor vis-à-vis 
third countries. What demands does it bring to multi- and bilateral venues, which kinds of 
tactics does it employ, and when is this unitary entity successful in reaching its goals? 
Authors have looked at the importance of internal divisions in determining the EU’s 
negotiating leverage (Meunier 2005), at the kinds of policies it tries to export (De Bièvre and 
Poletti 2013; Young 2015), or at specific issue such as the composition of its anti-dumping 
measures (Rovegno and Vandenbussche 2011). Here, a small number of scholars has debated 
whether the EU is a ‘special’ kind of trade actor, with some contending it is indeed promoting 
a particular model of globalization (see Meunier and Abdelal’s work on ‘managed 
globalization’, 2010) while others have claimed otherwise (i.e. Zimmermann’s ‘Realist Power 
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Europe’ 2007). In general, however, the literature has spent far more time studying the 
specifics of everyday decision-making and policies than thinking about what the EU ‘is’. In 
that sense, EU trade policy research policy can be characterized as ‘post-ontological’ 
(Caporaso 1996 in Della Sala 2015: 4).  
In sum, the majority of works published on EU trade policy has its roots in rational-
institutionalism and (materialist) political economy. However, although there is a strong drive 
towards the development of generalizing theories it would be unjust to lambast this literature 
for some of the criticisms often lodged at contemporary International Relations: excessive 
abstraction, an interest in theory over empirics or naïve falsificationism. Many authors 
working in this field have become increasingly interested in constructivist ‘variables’ related 
to ideas and discourse (Orbie & Kerremans, 2013), and their neopositivism has remained 
complexity-sensitive. This is reflected in their preferred choice of methods: although there is 
some statistical work, most claims are based on qualitative assessments of archival sources, 
news media and interviews, while formal modeling is almost completely absent. Moreover, as 
is shown in the next section, the field’s space for less conventional analyses has widened in 
the past ten years – both at its core and on the fringes. 
 
2.2 Growing diversity 
A small but growing amount of authors has distanced themselves more clearly from the (itself 
increasingly eclectic) mainstream. Although none of them (to my knowledge) have self-
identified as interpretivist,
6
 their work shows a clear affinity with core aspects of this 
methodology.
7
 Recurring characteristics include (i) a call for more holistic approaches, 
chastising the abstractions of the mainstream (ii) a focus on discourse, rhetoric and argument; 
(iii) a more overt normative dimension, criticizing both the substance of European policies as 
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well as the ways in which the Commission (and some academics) have tried to discursively 
legitimize (or obscure) it’s liberal agenda.  
Again organizing them thematically, the discourse analyses have without doubt 
created the most output. The majority of these studies have focused on the Commission and 
the ways in which it has responded to various offensives against its (free) trade agenda. They 
have done so through a variety of different lenses. Crespy (2014) for example, uses 
‘discursive institutionalism’ to study the wrestling match between citizen groups and the 
Commission over the General Agreement on Trade on Services (GATS). She shows how 
NGOs and trade unions ‘agreed’ on their narrative early on, barely altering its basic elements 
(GATS as serving big business, and as a threat to democracy and public services) over several 
years of contestation. However, their main sparring partner, the Commission, remained deaf 
to their pleas. Its unvarying response rejected some claims of the NGOs as being myths while 
ignoring others (particularly the ‘public services’ dimension of the deal). The only times the 
EC altered its narrative was when it was forced to speak in a different institutional setting, i.e. 
when addressing the Parliament. Crespy’s work bears some similarity to that of De Ville and 
Orbie (2014), who investigate the Commission’s trade discourse since the post-2008 
economic crises. Again the emphasis is on how the Commission has tried to sell its liberal 
agenda through subtle discursive moves, in response to various kinds of pushback. After 
positioning their thinking vis-à-vis critical discourse analysis, constructivism and post-
structuralism, the authors situate themselves as part of the reflexive and critical strand of 
‘structurationist’ constructivism. 8  Holden (2015) investigates the same subject of the 
Commission’s crisis-era speech on trade and development, though his theoretical mix of 
Faircloughian critical-discourse analysis and neo-Gramscianism puts a lot more emphasis on 
underlying material drivers. He argues that the neo-liberal hegemony has retained its grip, but 
has become more confrontational and realist. Not because it has been challenged by any 
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strong counter-ideologies, but because of the altered (geo-)economic landscape. Although it 
does not include any such meta-theorizing, the same theme of legitimation and contestation is 
also present in De Ville’s recent book with Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2015); this time in the war 
of words over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (see section 3.3).  
A rare exception to the emphasis on the Commission is the paper by Mathieu and 
Weinblum (Mathieu & Weinblum, 2013) which looks at how members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) have rallied around the need for fair trade, even though the exact content 
and the policy implications of this ‘floating signifier’ differ immensely across MEPs’ 
ideologies. Referring to Foucault, de Saussure and Laclau and Mouffe, they build this analysis 
on a theory of discourse that rejects its use as a ‘variable among others’, emphasizing that 
‘discourse creates the space for possible and legitimate options; it defines what/who is and 
what/who is not considered as being legitimate and authorized, and what/who is to be 
excluded’ (Mathieu and Weinblum 2013: 188). This theoretical position (which shares some 
commonalities with those of De Ville, Orbie and Crespy) distances them somewhat from the 
more conventional social-constructivist work done by Woll (2008) and Arne Niemann (2004, 
2013). For instance, the latter has operationalized Habermas’ theory of ‘communicative 
action’ to study the role of argument and deliberation,9 viewing the explanatory potential of 
such communication as dependent on a host of variables such as the lack of clear goals and 
strong preferences. Finally, they differ as well from the constructivist International Political 
Economy (IPE) of Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2013, 2014), who goes beyond the ideas-as-
variables strand of IPE while still searching explicitly for the (in)direct causal effect of 
beliefs.  
Although some of the authors mentioned above self-identify as critical, and often 
include more or less explicit normative judgments in their work, Orbie and Kerremans (2013) 
have noted that there is also a pronounced ‘radical’ strain in the literature. This includes for 
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example Bailey and Bossuyt (2013), who have developed a critique of the idea that the EU’s 
trade policy has been used for increasingly virtuous purposes since the mid-1990s. They 
fiercely contest portrayals of the EU as a ‘counter-hegemon’ against neoliberal globalization, 
as well as those that argue that this counter-hegemonic project failed because of internal 
divisions. Rather, they claim that the EU’s trade policy is nothing but the continuation of its 
own neoliberal and undemocratic drivers. They outline various ‘mechanisms of domination’ 
(‘othering’, de-politicization and the market mechanism), that serve to portray the EU as a 
force for the good whilst also making sure that its lofty ambitions will not be realized; they 
therefore choose to characterize the EU as a ‘conveniently conflicted counter-hegemon’. A 
similar analysis can be found in the work of Mark Langan (2015). Like Bailey and Bossuyt, 
he attacks the discrepancy between the EU’s stated goals in its new generation of trade 
agreements with the Maghreb, and the detrimental effects these deals will (probably) have on 
human well-being, economic development and migration flows. As this will in all likelihood 
lead to a ‘lose-lose’ scenario (both the EU’s and its partners’ goals will be damaged), he 
believes this course of action must be due to the (discursively reinforced) belief among EU 
policymakers that their aims are both ethically just and economically necessary for these 
countries. Finally, Lucy Ford (2013) situates her work within a critical-realist methodology, 
which allows her to focus on the political, social and discursive ‘frames’ in which EU trade 
policies are forged. She couples this with neo-Gramscian theory and a variety of concepts 
from global ecology in order to, again, arrive at an indictment of the EU. According to Ford, 
the narrative as well as its conduct are projecting neoliberal global governance, prioritizing 
the market over social and environmental sustainability. 
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2.3 Discussion 
In summary, a diverse and interesting scholarship has sprung up and has found its way to the 
field’s foremost journals and publishers. Still: the amount of (more or less) interpretivist 
analyses remains quite limited. The above overview here includes a large proportion of all 
published works, while the discussion of the mainstream was far from exhaustive. Moreover, 
many of these works focus on the trade-development nexus (see also Holden 2014, and the 
work by Hurt, Lee and Lorenz-Carl 2013), while other aspects (including for example intra-
EU struggles over supranational competence, multilateral negotiations or the trade defensive 
sub-system) have been neglected.  
It seems fair to say that these contributions look somewhat ‘patchy’: there are some 
thematic and philosophical similarities, but there is no discernible, consistent empirical or 
theoretical research-agenda. Although they often respond to, and contrast themselves with, 
mainstream approaches, there is no ongoing debate among interpretivist scholars about their 
(potential) contribution to EU trade research
10. This is further aggravated by some authors’ 
attempts to devise new labels for their ‘approaches’, even though the actual practice of their 
work is almost impossible to distinguish from what many others have been doing for a long 
time. For example, the way Mark Langan (2015) employs his ‘Moral Economy’ framework 
does not seem distinct from (for example) critical discourse analysis.
11
 To some extent the 
same is true for the discursive-institutionalism of Crespy or the structurationism of Orbie and 
De Ville. The questions they ask, the way they conduct their research, and how they support 
their claims differs less than their (meta) theoretical positioning would seem to imply. As I 
already pointed out, there are also difficulties with labeling all of these authors 
‘interpretivists’ – including some of the critical scholars.12  
In the end, however, these criticisms are mostly due to the (in itself surprising) fact 
that interpretivist researchers have only recently discovered European trade policy, and that 
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the amount of works, though swelling, remains limited. The next section outlines some of the 
ways in which the literature might move beyond its current state. 
 
3. EU Trade Policy and Interpretivism: Ways Forward 
The dynamics of European trade politics, as outlined in the previous sections of this chapter, 
cannot be fully grasped by positivist approaches alone. Not only because its high amount of 
‘ontological’ complexity should make us pessimistic about the prospects of discovering 
general laws (see Hammersley, 2014), but also because an interpretive epistemology is better 
suited to deal with many of the questions that we should seek to answer
13
. It would be 
unnecessary to further elaborate on the pros and cons of rational-institutionalist approaches to 
trade policy making here (see Siles-Brügge 2014, for an extensive but not wholly dismissive 
critique). Instead, in what follows I will focus on one specific set of questions and the kind of 
research, perhaps best described as ethnographic, that might flow from them. More 
specifically, I will zero in on the need to inject the current research about EU trade with a 
dose of Weberian ‘verstehen’: the need to think more clearly about the commitments, the 
motivations and the beliefs of the ‘actors’ that we are studying. Deeper insight of the rationale 
driving them will help us understand, and therefore explain, their actions (Ringer, 1997). 
The construction of a more nuanced and historicized picture of Europe’s foreign trade 
policy will inevitably force us to unpack the players involved, since we will want to probe the 
humans that, in the end, make up institutional ‘actors’ like the Council or the Commission. In 
what follows, I will illustrate how we may proceed by discussing three broad examples. These 
represent three steps on the ‘delegation chain’ that runs, through a web of intermediaries, 
from voters to supranational trade policy.  
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3.1 DG Free Trade? 
It is often claimed that the Commission is committed to free trade. Yet what this precisely 
entails, and why this is the case, has remained unclear.  
As for the latter, a wide host of answers seems possible. Perhaps it is the result of 
strong liberal leadership, as two out of three trade Commissioners have hailed from liberal 
parties,
14
 or DG Trade’s intrinsic belief in the merits of open trade. Others have claimed that 
this is merely a reflection of the wishes of the  member states, which delegated politically 
unpopular liberalization to the European level (Meunier, 2005). Still others may point at 
bureaucratic expansionism and supranationalization or the pressures from export-oriented 
business lobbying. Such questions have at times been dealt with (implicitly) by the literature 
on principle-agent dynamics between the Council and the EC, or in the works that look at 
interest-group lobbying. Discourse analyses have come closest to an attempt at deciphering 
the Commission’s thinking, but in the end still focus largely on the legitimizing and 
obfuscating function of the Commission’s speech (or rather: rhetoric).  
Nonetheless, the discursive studies have at least outlined one important potential 
answer for the ‘why’ question: the beliefs and ideological commitments of those involved in 
producing this policy, uncovered by analyzing the Commission’s various communications. It 
should immediately be evident that in such research, the ‘why’ cannot be detached from the 
‘what’ – in order to understand why the Commission has behaved in a certain way we must 
understand its view of what is at stake, which means it considers legitimate, and how it sees 
its role.  
An interesting sub-field of EU studies has sprung up which tries (by combining 
statistical analysis with elite interviews) to paint a picture of the background and views of the 
Commission’s personnel, as well as inter/intra-departmental politics and interactions (see 
especially Hartlapp, Metz and Rauh, 2014; Hooghe 2012; Hooghe 2001). However, trade 
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policymaking has not received much attention in these studies and their discussion of values 
and worldviews has tended to focus on rather broad cleavages (focusing, for example, on the 
left-right or technocratic-political axes). So far, there have not been any systematic studies of 
the way that trade Commissioners and (perhaps more importantly) personnel from DG Trade 
think and talk about commercial policy, where they stand on issues of ‘free’ and ‘fair’ trade, 
how they interpret such terms and how, in a general, they see their own part in propagating a 
certain model of globalization. How do they perceive the costs and benefits of our current 
system, or the current threats posed by emerging economies? What are their views on the 
need for ‘competitiveness’? Of what, for what purpose? Who are their clients, their 
beneficiaries, their adversaries? And who are the people involved in this work? Are they 
economists, lawyers, political scientists etc.? Are they ideologues, technocrats or career-
driven public servants?  
Fairbrother’s (2010) study of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between Canada, Mexico and the United States provides an interesting illustration of the kind 
of text this may produce. He looks at business and policy-making elites’ views about the 
rationale of free trade agreements and, with the exception of economically trained technical 
staff and contrary to some of the critics of such agreements, finds little evidence of any belief 
in the inherent superiority of free trade. Instead of adhering to the teachings of neoclassical 
economics, it turns out that most of the driving actors held deeply mercantilist views. They 
did not support NAFTA because of theories of comparative advantage, but because of zero-
sum thinking in terms of the trade balance, growth, and jobs
15
. These findings should also 
lead us to question prevalent views about the Commission’s support for unfettered commerce, 
especially when considering the somewhat contradictory beliefs that various academics 
currently hold about the Commission’s driving urges. As should be evident from the literature 
reviewed above, some believe it tends to tailgate dominant business actors, others propose 
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that it has an inherent desire to bolster the EU’s exporting interests, while a third group argues 
that the Commission’s preference for open trade stems from its genuine belief in the (win-
win) economic and social benefits provided by unhampered global markets. Although these 
different pluralist, mercantilist and neoclassical motivations can perhaps co-exist in practice
16
, 
there is an unresolved tension between these stories that should be excavated.  
There is a variety of ways this can be studied. Interviews with those involved in 
formulating policies would be an obvious choice, but more thorough analyses of the trade 
discourse across the years is also warranted. Although it will be challenging to analyze the 
discourse of DG Trade (or its Commissioner) across the wide variety of issues it is involved 
in at any time
17
, more insight on the fluctuations, the contradictions, the subtle changes across 
issues (and time!) may in fact also be one of the most interesting fruits of such labor. 
  
3.2 Unpacking the Council  
Moving away from the peak of the chain, we come to one of the major lacunae of EU trade 
policy research:
18
 the lack of attention paid to what’s happening below the supranational level 
(Alons 2013; Dür and Zimmerman 2007; Young 2007a). We know very little of how 
individual  member states’ positions come about, or of the role played by (sub)national 
politicians, trade unions, firms and citizens. This gap is just as present in the supposedly more 
complexity-sensitive and critical studies; even these largely study either ‘the EU’ or the 
Commission and its internal politics. And yet, the ways in which member states are discussed 
should certainly trouble interpretivist scholars.  
First of all, there is a strong tendency towards treating states as unitary ‘actors’ with 
identities, interests and beliefs. Speaking about ‘France’, ‘Germany’ or ‘Malta’ as if these 
abstract entities were doing the acting can certainly be useful in some cases – but only if we 
remember that this is an extremely simplified heuristic. In reality, as was remarked by the 
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historian Mark Gilbert (2008) in his criticism of ‘integration’ studies more generally, a state’s 
behavior is in the end nothing but the stylized representation of moves made by government 
officials, parties, prime ministers, cabinets, trade unionists, etc. all operating in their own local 
contexts according to their own logics. Secondly, there is a tendency to ignore the complex 
and potentially contradictory motives that may be driving member state preferences; at times 
by writing as if there is a perpetual gap between the ‘Northern’ and the ‘Southern’ approaches 
to trade, but more often by simply taking member state positions as a given (state x was pro, 
state y was contra) and assuming that they are acting on certain material interests in largely 
predictable ways. Almost always, member state preferences are treated as an exogenous 
‘given’; simple to summarize and easily distilled from press reports or elite interviews.   
Because the member states remain important actors in formulating EU trade policy, 
and since there is little prospect of the Council’s heterogeneity diminishing (Messerlin, 2001; 
Young, 2007b), the task for interpretive scholars seems clear. They need to help foster a 
thicker understanding of the policy process, the people involved, their motivations, the ways 
in which they see the world, and how all of this varies over time and space.  
Of course, the complexities involved are even greater than at the European level, if 
only for the amount of actors playing a role of potential importance. The most 
commonsensical way to proceed would therefore be by starting near the ‘top’ of the national 
delegation chain – with the trade policy officials spread across the ministries of trade, foreign 
affairs, agriculture and others. Here, scholars may for example expand the empirical work 
already done by someone like Johan Adriaensen (2014), who has compared trade decision 
making in Poland, Estonia, Spain and Belgium by looking (amongst other factors) at the 
educational and professional profile of the trade experts, the ways in which conflicts are 
handled or how ‘society’ is consulted. He barely tackles other important aspects however, 
such as how these people actually deal with societal input, who they interact with (in what 
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way), what their aspirations and beliefs are, how they are steered and incentivized, and how 
all of this ties in with their function and ‘output’ as trade policy officials.  
Comparative ethnographical studies of countries from various parts of the EU would 
offer some very interesting insights, considering the variation in state-society relations, 
economic paradigms, governmental cultures, socioeconomic interests, etc., and would allow 
us to refine the ‘what’ as well as the ‘why’ of  member state preferences. They will also allow 
us to better determine to what extent our usual heuristics (North versus South, unitary state 
preferences, the dominance of material interests and instrumental rationality) make sense. 
Such a study would then serve as a launching pad for further work on other and non-state 
actors. It would also allow us to further develop Niemann’s project (see Niemann 2004; 
2013), in understanding better how participation in the EU system has shaped national views 
on trade.  
 
3.3 Deep Trade, Protectionism and the Trade Debate 
In this last sub-section we arrive at the ‘societal’ level, by tying in the need for more 
interpretive research with what is seen as a major double movement of the past decades: the 
spread of trade negotiations towards new contentious terrain, and the associated (but uneven 
and fluctuating) backlash against this development since the 1990s.  
Arguably, this has been accompanied by at least two broad discursive shifts.  
First of all, there has been a tendency among the policy makers driving this new 
agenda, but also among academics studying it, to hang on to the phraseology of the ‘old’ trade 
politics even though the substance of negotiations has shifted markedly. As noted in the 
introduction, traditional commercial policy was mostly about tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping 
duties or other ‘at the border’ measures. This led to conflicts that are best described as 
distributive (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015): they were about who gets what domestically as 
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well as internationally. The terminology accompanying this struggle was that of ‘free trade’ 
versus ‘protectionism’, emphasizing the insider/outsider aspect of these instruments – which, 
undeniably, at least to some extent did serve to discriminate between domestic and foreign 
goods. However, there has been a tendency to use these same terms to describe the ‘behind 
the border’ issues that have entered trade negotiations’ crosshairs, continuously stretching the 
meaning of ‘barrier’ (Lang 2011: 309).19 Even though ‘regulatory’ and ‘technical’ barriers to 
trade often reflect political and normative struggles that did not involve their potential trade-
distorting effects, they are now scrutinized from behind the suspicious lens of the 
discriminatory-versus-free trade paradigm.
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 As Lang notes, to measure something ‘as a 
“barrier to trade” can also significantly alter perceptions of the desirability of that measure, 
and the nature of debates which accompany it. […] debates about the measure become 
subject to the dynamics of broader debates around economic liberalisation generally – 
whether for or against – which exist within the political culture in question’ (Lang, 2009: 30-
31). The clearest example of the kind of alarmist discourse this may lead to are the reports, 
published since the onset of the crisis, by Global Trade Alert. This ‘trade watchdog’ has kept 
a wary eye on government regulations across the globe, coding their potential discriminatory 
effect as either ‘red’, ‘amber’ or ‘green’, and generally concluding that the protectionist tide 
has been steadily rising (i.e. Global Trade Alert 2012).
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On the other hand, a counter-movement has sprung up; first in the 1999 ‘Battle of 
Seattle’, now (primarily) in the protests against TPP and TTIP. As is explained by De Ville 
and Siles-Brügge (2015), this movement has been anything but swayed by the distributive 
arguments of policy-makers. On the contrary, it has insisted on a normative critique of these 
deals, and has engaged in an intense struggle to reframe the debate; away from the supposed 
economic gains, and towards the threats posed to sovereignty, democracy and equity. 
According to NGOs like Corporate Europe Observatory or ATTAC, social, environmental 
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and health standards are endangered by a regulatory race to the bottom, while the 
controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions encroach on equality 
before the law (differentiating between citizens and foreign firms) as well as the government’s 
right to regulate. TTIP, which initially got off to a quiet and uncontroversial start, has 
increasingly become politicized.  
The struggle that has ensued has been fascinating. While Crespy (2014) still described 
the contestation (2001-2007) over the GATS agreement as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, in TTIP 
the Commission has responded by yielding to some core demands of the NGOs’ intense 
campaign; it has increased the transparency of the talks to ‘unprecedented’ levels, and has 
completely re-written its ISDS proposal. However, it has done so without yielding 
discursively (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015). It has continued to advertise the overarching 
goal of TTIP in geopolitical and economic terms, while still referring to regulatory differences 
as barriers to trade. Of course, these arguments have been unable to convince those that reject 
the deal on normative grounds.  
These two shifts deserve further scrutiny from interpretive scholars. The way this 
contentious process of reframing has taken place within the EU, one of the important 
proponents of the new agenda, has not yet received much attention. Again analyses of the 
institutions will remain necessary. Are DG Trade’s narratives ‘strategic’? Or are they first and 
foremost the ‘rational’, normative conclusion drawn from their worldview, perhaps as part of 
their wider socialization in the sphere of international trade policy formation? Similar studies 
of the EP and the Council would be useful as well. For the remainder of this chapter, 
however, I will focus on two more ‘societal’ research avenues we may want to explore.  
First, much is made of the controversial nature of the new trade agenda. Yet it is 
unclear if the opposition to this trend has been widespread or durable. Since NGOs will in the 
end always be dependent (to some extent) on public support if they want to enact durable 
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change, they (and the research community) will want to understand why this supposedly new 
era of norm-driven debates has (i) been met with such apparent disinterest by the vast 
majority of the public, and (ii) why the first pique of contestation petered out after 1999 until 
it resurfaced, a decade of relative quiet later. Although there have been several surveys about 
the support for globalization, free trade and also TTIP,
22
 we still know quite little about what 
(and whether) ‘the public’ thinks about these deals, and whether it really cares about them in 
the ways NGOs are telling us. Many of the questions we would like to ask in ‘higher’ parts of 
the delegation chain remain just as relevant here, with the added dimension of basic 
awareness: do people know these deals exist, do they care? And how do they feel about the 
arguments over sovereignty, food safety and regulatory cultures? These same questions also 
apply to activists, although here we must also wonder how important they think trade-related 
topics are compared to other battles. Perhaps the threat from these rather technical 
international deals is just not tangible enough to keep their memberships interested, and 
NGOs may have to diversify their work and focal points if they want to be able to rely on the 
constrained resources of potential campaigners.
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Secondly, the opponents of these deals strongly emphasize the discrepancy in 
‘regulatory cultures’ between the US and the EU.24 However, by doing this there is a danger 
that they themselves are exaggerating the homogeneity of European views at stake here. In 
fact, if the origin of the current contestation is truly normative, then perhaps this explains the 
wide variety in attention and support paid to TTIP across Europe. Protests have been 
concentrated in Germany, Austria, the UK and the Netherlands. Perhaps people from the 
‘South’ and the ‘East’ care more about geopolitics than sovereignty and GMOs? Or maybe 
political agendas have just been dominated by other, more pressing worries. Again, 
interviews, analyses of (social) media and other such investigations, not just of the proverbial 
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‘man in the street’ but also of trade unionists, business owners, party officials, et cetera, 
would help us understand the broad trends hinted at by surveys.  
 
4. Conclusion 
A majority of the existing research on EU trade policy has its roots in rationalist-
institutionalism. This ‘mainstream’ has become increasingly eclectic in the past decade, and a 
small but growing amount of authors has distanced themselves more clearly from the 
dominant current. Although they tend to self-identify as constructivist and ‘critical’ rather 
than interpretivist, their work shows a clear affinity with core aspects of the latter 
methodology. However, there is no real ‘research program’ binding these scholars together 
and their work remains a small proportion of the field’s total output. This is a pity, because a 
more expansive interpretivist agenda would yield important insights about the complex and 
increasingly normative politics of European trade.  
More specifically, I argued that the construction of a ‘thicker’ picture of European 
trade policy will require that we look at the commitments and worldviews of the people 
involved in producing it. Along three steps of the ‘delegation chain’, I showed where such a 
line of inquiry may take us: an exploration of the language, the ways of thinking and the 
overall institutional and discursive context in which DG Trade, national trade administrations 
and ‘the public’ are embedded.  
Of course these suggestions have their limitations. Much of what I have proposed can 
be seen as complementary to existing approaches – which may rattle the chains of more 
devoutly anti-positivist interpretivists. Perhaps it is also too much oriented, for the taste of 
many critical scholars, at contributing to our understanding of why the EU does what it does, 
instead of questioning these goals and their effects (or the kind of academic output that 
accompanies them). More prosaically, I have also not discussed any of the practical hurdles 
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that will emerge for researchers wishing to do in-depth interviews with DG Trade or 28 
national trade representatives.  
I can only concede that I occupy a hesitant middle ground; yet I still hope this chapter 
will help invigorate a wide variety of approaches to this important subject.  
 
References.  
Abdelal, R. and S. Meunier (2010), 'Managed globalization: doctrine, practice and promise', 
Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (3), 350–367. 
Adriaensen, Johan (2014), Politics without Principals : National Trade Administrations and 
EU Trade Policy, Leuven: LINES. 
Alons, G. (2013), 'European external trade policy: the role of ideas in German preference 
formation', Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9 (4), 501–520. 
Bailey, D. and F. Bossuyt (2013), 'The European union as a conveniently-conflicted 
counterhegemon through trade', Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9 (4), 
560–577. 
Bollen, Y. (2016), 'Unpacking Member State Preferences In Trade Policy – A Research 
Agenda', Prepared for the “EU Trade Policy at the Crossroads” Conference, 4-6 
February 2016, Vienna. 
Bown, C.P. (2014), 'Trade Policy Instruments over Time', World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 6757. 
Caporaso, J. A. (1996), ‘The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or 
Post-Modern?’,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1), 29–52. 
Comino, A. (2007), 'A Dragon in Cheap Clothing: What Lessons can be Learned from the 
EU-China Textile Dispute?', European Law Journal, 13(6), 818–838. 
Crespy, A. (2014), 'A Dialogue of the Deaf? Conflicting Discourses over the EU and Services 
Liberalisation in the WTO', The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 
16(1), 168–187. 
da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia (2011), Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
De Bièvre, Dirk and Arlo Poletti  (2013), 'The EU in trade policy : From regime shaper to 
status quo power', in Gerda Falkner and Patrick Müller (eds), EU Policies in a Global 
Perspective: Shaping or taking international regimes?, London: Routledge, 20–37. 
24 
 
De Ville, Ferdi and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2015), TTIP - The truth about the transatlantic 
trade and investment partnership, Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. 
Della Sala, V. (2015), 'Understanding the Crisis: Did EU Studies Get It Wrong?', Unpublished 
Draft. 
Diez, Thomas (2016), 'European Politics', in Mark Bevir and R. A. Rhodes (eds), Routledge 
Handbook of Interpretive Political Science, New York: Routledge, 268–281. 
Dür, A. (2007), 'EU Trade Policy as Protection for Exporters: The Agreements with Mexico 
and Chile', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4), 833–855. 
Dür, A. and D. De Bièvre (2007), 'Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European Trade 
Policy', Journal of Public Policy, 27 (01), 79-101. 
Dür, A. and M. Elsig (2011), 'Principals, agents and the European Union’s foreign economic 
policies', Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (3), 323–338. 
Dür, A. and G. Mateo (2014), 'Public opinion and interest group influence: how citizen groups 
derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement', Journal of European Public Policy, 
21(8), 1199-1217. 
Dür, A. and H. Zimmerman (2007), 'Introduction: The EU in International Trade 
Negotiations', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4), 771–787. 
Eckhardt, J. (2011), 'Firm lobbying and EU trade policymaking: Reflections on the anti-
dumping case against Chinese and Vietnamese shoes (2005-2011)', Journal of World 
Trade, 45, 965–991. 
Elsig, M. (2010), 'European Union trade policy after enlargement: larger crowds, shifting 
priorities and informal decision-making', Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (6), 
781–798. 
Fairbrother, M. (2010), 'Trade policymaking in the real world: elites’ conflicting worldviews 
and north american integration', Review of International Political Economy, 17 (2), 1–44. 
Ford, L. (2013), 'EU trade governance and policy: a critical perspective', Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, 9 (4), 578–596. 
Garcia, M. (2010), 'Fears and Strategies : The European Union , China and their Free Trade 
Agreements in East Asia', Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6 (4), 496– 
513. 
Gastinger, M. (2015), 'The tables have turned on the European Commission: the changing 
nature of the pre-negotiation phase in EU bilateral trade agreements', Journal of 
European Public Policy, 1–19. Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1079233.  
25 
 
Gilbert, M. (2008), 'Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European 
Integration', Journal of Common Market Studies, 46 (3), 641–662. 
Global Trade Alert (2012), Débâcle : The 11th GTA Report on Protectionism, London: CEPR. 
Hammersley, Martyn (2014), The limits of social science, London: Sage Publishing. 
Hanson, B. T. (2003), 'What Happened to Fortress Europe? External Trade Policy 
Liberalization in the European Union', International Organization, 52 (01), 55–85. 
Hartlapp, Miriam, Julie Metz and Christian Rauh (2014), Which Policy for Europe? Power 
and Conflict Inside the European Commission, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heron, T. (2007), 'European trade diplomacy and the politics of global development: 
Reflections on the EU-China “bra wars” dispute', Government and Opposition, 42 (2), 
190–214. 
Holden, P. (2014), 'Tensions in the discourse and practice of the European Union’s Aid for 
Trade', Contemporary Politics, 20 (1), 90–102. 
Holden, P. (2015), 'Neo-liberalism by default? The European Union’s trade and development 
policy in an era of crisis', Journal of International Relations and Development, advance 
online publication, 3 April 2015. 
Holmes, P. (2006), 'Trade and “domestic” policies: the European mix', Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13(6), 815–831. 
Hooghe, L. (2012), 'Images of Europe: How Commission Officials Conceive Their 
Institution’s Role', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 50 (1), 87–111. 
Hooghe, Liesbet (2001), The European Commission and the integration of Europe : images of 
governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hurt, S.R., D. Lee and U. Lorenz-Carl (2013), 'The Argumentative Dimension to the EU-
Africa EPAs', International Negotiation, 18 (1), 67–87. 
Jackson, P. Thaddeus (2011), The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, New York: 
Routledge. 
Lang, A. (2009), 'Legal regimes and regimes of knowledge: governing global services trade', 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 15/2009. 
Lang, Andrew (2011), World trade law after neoliberalism : re-imagining the global 
economic order, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Langan, M. (2015), 'The moral economy of EU relations with North African states: DCFTAs 
under the European Neighbourhood Policy', Third World Quarterly, 36 (10), 1827–1844. 
Larsén, M. F. (2007), 'Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three-Level 
Game', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4), 857–881. 
26 
 
Mathieu, J.F. and S. Weinblum (2013), 'The Battle Against Unfair Trade in the EU Trade 
Policy: A Discourse Analysis of Trade Protection', Perspectives on European Politics 
and Society, 14 (2), 185–202. 
Messerlin, Patrick (2001), Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe - European         
Commercial Policy in the 2000S, Washington D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics.  
Meunier, Sophie (2005), Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial 
Negotiations, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaïdis (1999), 'Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade    
Authority in the EU', Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (3), 477–501. 
Niemann, A. (2004), 'Between communicative action and strategic action: the Article 113 
Committee and the negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services 
Agreement', Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (3), 379–407. 
Niemann, A. (2013), 'EU external trade and the treaty of lisbon: a revised neofunctionalist 
approach', Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(4), 633–658. 
Orbie, J. and B. Kerremans (2013), 'Theorizing European union trade politics: Contending or 
complementary paradigms?', Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9 (4), 493–
500. 
Orbie, Jan and Ferdi De Ville (2014), 'A Boost to our Economies that Doesn’t Cost a Cent’: 
EU Trade Policy Discourse Since the Crisis', in Catarina Carta and Jean-Frédéric Morin 
(eds), EU Foreign Policy Trough the Lense of Foreign Policy, Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 95–110. 
Poletti, Arlo (2012), The European Union and Multilateral Trade Governance, Oxon: 
Routledge. 
Ringer, Fritz (1997), Max Weber’s Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social 
Sciences, Contemporary Sociology, London: Harvard University Press. 
Ringer, Fritz (2004), Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography, London: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Rovegno, L. and H. Vandenbussche (2011), 'A comparative analysis of EU Antidumping 
rules and application', Institute for Economic and Social Research Discussion Paper, 
KUL (2011-23).  
Siles-Brügge, G. (2013), 'Explaining the resilience of free trade: The Smoot–Hawley myth 
and the crisis', Review of International Political Economy, 21 (3), 535–574. 
Siles-Brügge, Gabriel (2014), Constructing European Union Trade Policy - A Global Idea of 
27 
 
Europe, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
WTO (2012), World Trade Report 2012 - Trade and public policies: A closer look at non-
tariff measures in the 21st century, Geneva: WTO. 
Young, A. (2007a), 'Trade Politics Ain’t What it Used to Be: The Challenges for EU Policy 
and Analysis', Paper Prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, 
17-19 May 2007, Montreal. 
Young, A. (2007b), 'Trade Politics Ain’t What it Used to Be: The European Union in the 
Doha Round', Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4), 789–811. 
Young, A. (2015), 'Liberalizing trade, not exporting rules: the limits to regulatory co-
ordination in the EU’s “new generation” preferential trade agreements', Journal of 
European Public Policy, 22 (9), 1253–1275. 
Young, Alasdair and John Peterson (2014), Parochial Global Europe, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Zimmermann, H. (2007), 'Realist power Europe? The EU in the negotiations about China’s 
and Russia's WTO accession', Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4), 813–832. 
 
28 
 
                                       
1  I would like to thank Jan Orbie, Krenar Gashi and Ferdi De Ville for their many 
valuable comments and suggestions.  
2  Unless the deal includes aspects that are not the exclusive but the shared competence of 
the EU, in which case the ‘mixed agreement’ needs a unanimous Council and 
ratification by individual Member States. This scenario has become far more unlikely 
since Lisbon.  
3  Although most of these tools are still constrained by international trade law, enforced by 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system.  
4  Or the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) recently concluded (though not yet ratified) 
between the United States and eleven other countries.  
5  Of course, many will argue that its role has already started withering – especially after 
the Eurozone malaise set in.  
6  As in the rest of EU studies (see Diez 2016) ‘constructivism’ is the more commonly 
used label. 
 7  Methodology in Peter Jackson’s (2011) terms: a set of ontological and epistemological 
claims about what social science is, and can or should do.  
8  As they explain in their text, this means that they hold a ‘dialectical’ view of the 
agency-structure debate: “structures of intersubjective meaning do not simply provide 
the context within which agents operate, but [these agents are] also continuously 
(re)constructing the discursive environment through ‘speech acts’ (Diez 1999) or ‘text’ 
(Fairclough 1995)” (Orbie & De Ville, 2014 : 97). 
9  His work has looked at the Trade Policy Committee’s deliberations on the Basic 
Telecommunication Directive and at the discussion over trade policy competences in 
the ‘constitutional’ convention. 
10  With the exception of Siles-Brügge (2014), who is explicitly advocating the application 
of constructivist IPE to trade policy.  
11  Which Langan treats and uses as a method in his work, without pointing out the 
analytical/philosophical value added of the Moral Economy approach.  
12  Again one of Langan’s core assumptions illustrates the point, namely his claim that 
‘legitimizing norms [can be contrasted with] the knowable material impact of economic 
structures for their nominal beneficiaries’ (2015: 4). Similar ‘fact’-checking tendencies 
can be found, though somewhat more implicitly, in the work of (amongst others) 
Holden (2014; 2015), Orbie and De Ville (2014) as well as Bailey and Bossuyt (2013). 
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13  However, I follow Ringer (1997, 2004) in resisting the idea that positivist 
(‘nomological’) studies cannot contribute to such a project. I consider these approaches 
as being, to a large extent, complementary. For a competing view, see Jackson (2011).  
14  Liberal in regards to economic policy. Papering over the ideological differences that 
probably distinguish Commissioners hailing from nominally similar ‘camps’, the 
liberals reigned for (roughly) 33 years, the social-democrats for 17 years and the 
Christian-democrats for three.   
15  Although economists’ technical standing did provide for some lubrication by lending 
their ‘expert’s seal of approval’ to the deal.  
16  They may also differ across Commissioners and even within DGs. Young and Peterson, 
for example, claim (without going into much detail) that the sub-directorate in charge of 
trade defenses is more protectionist than DG Trade’s ideological average (Young and 
Peterson 2014).  
17  Multilateral and bilateral deals, deals with industrialized as well as developing 
economies, with formal colonies, the design and implementation of unilateral sticks and 
carrots, investment, rules of origin, varying sectors (agriculture versus services) etc etc. 
18  I have developed the arguments in this section more thoroughly elsewhere. See Bollen 
2016.  
19  See also Lang’s sophisticated treatment of how an informal (but increasingly codified 
and quantified) notion of ‘a barrier to trade’ (in services) has emerged through expert 
interactions and interpretations, and how this has fed into policy-makers’ worldviews 
and agendas.  
20  Of course, some of these measures may indeed be designed specifically to discriminate 
against foreign trade. See WTO (2012) and Lang (2011) for good discussions of this 
debate.   
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21  This has to some extent also been visible in, and arguably reinforced by, the academic 
debates over trade politics. The metaphor of ‘the swamp’ has been popular here, 
focusing our attention on the non-tariff ‘stumps’ that emerged as conventional barriers 
were drained. Although originally used by Baldwin (1970) to denote the use of non-
tariff at-the-border-barriers like anti-dumping duties (quoted in Bown 2014: 2), the 
metaphor has remained popular and has spread to behind-the-border regulations, see for 
example Holmes (2006). There have been numerous attempts to estimate the trade-
distorting effects of these regulations in order determine how protectionist a country is, 
calculating new, composite variables that are then regressed on a host of factors like the 
country’s economic interdependence, its trade balance, exchange rate fluctuations et 
cetera, in order to research the ‘determinants of protectionism’ (for many examples and 
a detailed discussion of this debate see WTO 2012 and Lang 2009).  
22  For TTIP see the Eurobarometer surveys conducted by the EC, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/, for freely available data related 
to globalization and trade see PEW http://www.pewresearch.org/.  
23  As has happened in the case of TTIP, by tying the deal to ‘chlorineated chickens’ and 
climate change trade may yet become part of other, perhaps more durable ‘permanent 
campaigns’ 
24  De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015), for example, criticize the Commission for acting as if 
the US and the EU are a value community (to make a deal more feasible by ‘othering’ 
China). According to them, it is thereby strategically moving away from the frame that 
was prevalent before the post-2008 crises, which held that worldviews differed greatly 
across the Atlantic (with the EU representing soft power and managed globalization). 
